Fear: Trump in the White House(86)

The memo said the meeting established that the goal in Afghanistan was to “reshape the security environment” to limit the Taliban’s military options and “encourage them to negotiate a political settlement that reduces violence and denies safe haven to terrorists.”

Trump authorized Mattis to designate the Taliban and the terrorist Haqqani Network in Pakistan as hostile forces.

Buried in the 19-page section on integrated strategy was an admission: “Stalemate likely to persist in Afghanistan” and “Taliban likely to continue to gain ground.”

In the tradition of concealing the real story in a memo, “Win is unattainable” was the conclusion signed by McMaster.



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“You’re the first person I called,” Trump told Graham. “I just met with the generals. I’m going to go with the generals.”

“Well, Mr. President that’s probably the smartest thing any president could have done.”

“That was a hard one,” Trump said. “It’s the graveyard of empires.” It was a reference to a book by Seth G. Jones on Afghanistan.

“It’s my luck the only book you ever read was that one,” Graham joked.

Trump laughed along.



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“Off the record,” Trump said to his senior staff on Air Force One, though there was no press present on Friday, August 18, “I just fired Bannon. Did you see what he said about North Korea and having no military option? Motherfucker!”

Bannon had just given an interview to Robert Kuttner of the liberal American Prospect suggesting that Trump’s belligerent language to North Korea threatening “fire and fury” was a bluff.

“There’s no military solution here,” Bannon said. “They got us.” He added, “Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that 10 million people in Seoul don’t die in the first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I don’t know what you’re talking about.”

Trump was worried about a prolonged war of words with Bannon and upset that he wasn’t going quietly.



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A nationally televised Afghanistan strategy speech was set for Monday night, August 21, in front of a military audience at Fort Myer in Virginia. This was a big deal—one of Trump’s first formal announcements of a policy before a large audience.

“My original instinct was to pull out—and historically, I like following my instincts,” Trump said. Three times he said the goal was to “win” and said, “We will not talk about numbers of troops or our plans for further military.”

With that, Trump dodged Bush’s and Obama’s Achilles’ heel. His strategy had the effect of pushing the Afghanistan War debate away, off the front page and out of the news unless there was a major act of violence.

John McCain commented, “I commend President Trump for taking a big step in the right direction with the new strategy for Afghanistan.” Democratic senator and Clinton running mate Tim Kaine said the U.S. needed to “make sure that Afghanistan is not a breeding ground for things that can come back and hurt us.”

Bannon spoke with Stephen Miller. “What the fuck was that speech about?” Bannon said. “First of all, it just went around in circles.”

The speech did not really go in circles. It was both new and more of the same Obama strategy. Bannon’s chief objection was the lack of realism. “You can’t have him sitting there talking about victory. There’s not going to be a victory.”

Trump clung to the rhetoric of winning. He had given the military, Mattis and McMaster, just enough. The military had saved face and did not have to admit defeat.

The day after the president’s speech, Tillerson found another way to declare that a win was not attainable. He addressed the Taliban at a press briefing: “You will not win a battlefield victory. We may not win one, but neither will you.”

Stalemate.





CHAPTER





32




Kelly and Porter spent several weeks at Bedminster with the president during the August congressional recess. The new chief of staff was of the view that the White House was a muddle. Priebus and Bannon had been amateurs. He would instill some order and discipline.

“We’ve sort of tried to do this a little bit,” Porter said. He told Kelly how Priebus had taken a run at establishing order. Several months earlier Priebus had the top staffers—McMaster, Cohn, Bannon, Kellyanne Conway and Porter—for a meeting in a strategy room in the Executive Office Building.

“We need a strategy,” Priebus had said. “What are the priorities? How are we going to sequence them?” He wrote the ideas on whiteboards that lined the walls of the strategy room. It was like a SCIF for the most highly classified discussions. It was filled with computers and video teleconferencing equipment.

Ideas from the session were never taken seriously. The president often made decisions with only one or two or three people involved. There was no process for making and coordinating decisions. Chaos and disorder were inadequate to describe the situation. It was a free-for-all. The president would have an idea and say, “I want to sign something.” And Porter would have to explain that while Trump had broad authority to issue executive orders, for example, a president was frequently restricted by law. Trump had no understanding of how government functioned. At times he would just start drafting orders himself or dictating. The basic tactic Porter had employed from the Priebus days until now was to stall and delay, mention the legal roadblocks and occasionally lift the drafts from the Resolute Desk.