Fear: Trump in the White House(85)

“I’m tired of hearing that,” Trump said, “because you guys could say that about every country in the world. You keep talking about there’s ISIS all over. They could be organizing an attack on us. We can’t be everywhere.”

Trump exploded, most particularly at his generals. You guys have created this situation. It’s been a disaster. You’re the architects of this mess in Afghanistan. You created these problems. You’re smart guys, but I have to tell you, you’re part of the problem. And you haven’t been able to fix it, and you’re making it worse.

And now, he added, echoing Sessions, you’re wanting to add even more troops to something I don’t believe in. I was against this from the beginning.

He folded his arms. “I want to get out,” the president said. “And you’re telling me the answer is to get deeper in.”

Mattis, with his quiet style, had immense impact on the decision. He was not a confronter. As he often did, he adopted the approach that less was more.

I think what you’re saying is right, he told Trump, and your instincts are right on the money. But a new approach could work—ending artificial Obama-style timelines and lifting restrictions on the on-the-ground commanders. Leaving could precipitate the collapse of the Afghan state. U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan had left the vacuum for al Qaeda to create a terrorist sanctuary leading to the 9/11 attacks. The problem is that a new terrorist attack, especially a large one, originating from Afghanistan would be a catastrophe.

He argued that if they pulled out, they would create another ISIS-style upheaval. ISIS already had a presence in Afghanistan.

What happened in Iraq under Obama with the emergence of ISIS will happen under you, Mattis told Trump, in one of his sharpest declarations. It was a barb that several present remembered.

“You all are telling me that I have to do this,” Trump said grudgingly, “and I guess that’s fine and we’ll do it, but I still think you’re wrong. I don’t know what this is for. It hasn’t gotten us anything. We’ve spent trillions,” he exaggerated. “We’ve lost all these lives.” Yet, he acknowledged, they probably could not cut and run and leave a vacuum for al Qaeda, Iran and other terrorists.



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After the meeting, Sessions called Bannon. “He spit the bit,” Sessions said, using a term for an exhausted, worn-down racehorse’s rejection of its rider’s control.

“Who?” Bannon asked.

“Your boy, Pompeo.”

“What are you talking about?”

“That was the worst presentation I ever saw,” Sessions said. He and Kellogg had done their best. “I couldn’t have been any better. Kellogg was fantastic. McMaster was actually better than he’s ever been, because you weren’t around. The president actually said afterwards that I and Kellogg made the best presentation. But clearly the president was looking for the middle option as an alternative.”

“How bad was Pompeo?”

“His heart wasn’t in it.”

“How could it not be?”

Bannon called Pompeo. “What the fuck happened? We set this whole thing up for you to come and own it.”

“I can take that building only so far,” Pompeo said of the CIA. “I’ve got other fights I’ve got to win.”

Pompeo reported what the senior officials at Langley were telling him: What are you doing? Pompeo was getting excellent reviews and Trump liked his style. You’re on a roll. But you’re going to be held accountable for this.

One person at Langley had told him, We spent 10 years in Washington making sure we weren’t held accountable for anything in Afghanistan. Why are you volunteering? We never volunteer for anything. Don’t worry about Bannon. He is a clown. He’s crazy. This is the Pentagon trying to trap us because they want out, too.

Pompeo described the CIA’s position. “We don’t have the apparatus to take command of this. This is something the Army’s got to do. You’re saying make it a joint venture. We don’t have those kinds of resources. We don’t have that kind of expertise on the scale they’re talking about. We’re not going to take responsibility. Are you going to take responsibility for Afghanistan? Because we’re not going to win. You understand we’re not going to win!” And that would be hard because Trump was saying, “How come we’re not winning? How come they’re [the Taliban] blowing up guys?”

Bannon talked to Trump by phone. “You know where I stand on this,” Bannon said. “I think eventually you’re going to come to see the middle ground.”

“You didn’t hear the whole thing,” Trump said. “There’s really a new strategy in there, and we’re going to win.”

At the August 18 NSC meeting, Trump approved McMaster’s four Rs. Summarized in a 60-page strategy memo dated August 21 signed by McMaster, they were formalized as, Reinforce: “provide more equipment and training but leverage support with conditions to drive reforms”; Realign: “US civilian assistance and political outreach will be realigned to target key areas under government control with contested areas considered on case by case basis”; Reconcile: “diplomatic efforts will urge government to undertake broader efforts to foster inclusivity and political accommodation, promote elections, and conduct outreach of ethnic and regional powerbrokers”; and Regionalize: “work with regional actors.”