Fear: Trump in the White House(76)

Priebus was surprised at his open hostility. He realized that Tillerson’s real grievance was also the way the president talked to him. In many Situation Room meetings Tillerson would almost literally huff and puff, conspicuously telegraphing that he was more than just annoyed, masking the “moron” talk, but barely.

Priebus suggested that Tillerson tone it down. “You can’t just be disrespectful. You can’t talk to the president the way you do. You’ve got to find a way to communicate, say the same thing but find a way to say it that’s not offensive.”

Priebus admired Mattis’s approach—avoid the confrontation, demonstrate respect and deference, proceed smartly with business, travel as much as possible, get and stay out of town.

Tillerson returned to the generals. “I can’t sit there and listen to the president dress down these generals. I just can’t take it. It’s not right.”

Priebus later told Trump that he had spoken to Tillerson about being disrespectful to the president. He did not mention the “moron” comment.

Trump listened quietly, which was unusual, and did not disagree about what was going on. Priebus thought that the president did not want to acknowledge Tillerson’s hostility because he was full of pride. As chief executive he should not allow clear insubordination from his secretary of state.



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At times the NSC process worked. A Policy Coordination Committee, one level below the Deputies Committee, would convene and gather input from the Joint Staff, civilians at the Defense Department, the State Department, the intelligence agencies, Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget. A 30-page strategy paper might be drafted, with annexes. Disagreements would be ironed out. Then it would be sent up to the Deputies Committee, where deputies from various departments could make changes. When everyone agreed on a framework, when a roadmap was approved, a Principals Committee, chaired by McMaster and attended by cabinet secretaries, would be called.

Tillerson was senior and so talked first at principals meetings. He would walk in and say, I didn’t see the NSC strategy paper. This is a tough issue. We have to put it in perspective. Here’s how I’m looking at it.

He would distribute a package of briefing slides. Rather than send them prior to the meeting so others could read ahead, he went through each slide at the meeting, sometimes taking five minutes on just one. The members of the NSC were a captive audience. The principals meetings were often scheduled for an hour and 15 minutes, so sometimes Tillerson’s was the only voice, certainly the main voice.

Tillerson wanted to have everyone agree with his definition of the problems and then go back and rework the strategy.

These Tillerson interventions—his desire to restart the entire interagency process based on his assessment of where policies needed to go—happened in one form or another on the strategies for Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Hezbollah, Syria, China, North Korea and defeating ISIS.

Some at the Principals Committee meetings, including both those at the table and the backbenchers, were at times impressed with the reframing. Others thought his presentations conventional. Tillerson would argue for more economic integration, coordination of development assistance and the need to address the motivators of violence and actively use diplomacy.

What was often lacking or delayed was an execution plan assigning responsibility and accountability. Endgame goals were fuzzy or unstated. The result was often weeks or months of delay.



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Around this time in July, Trump was on a small plane, still designated Air Force One, returning from Bedminster. He came back to the small staff area where Ivanka, Jared, McMaster and Porter were seated.

Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, the three main war zones, were quagmires and he was tired of owning them, the president said in a lecturing tone. “The enormous resources that we continue to expend in those countries!” he said. “We should just declare victory, end the wars and bring our troops home.”

McMaster seemed crestfallen. After six months as commander in chief, Trump wanted to sweep it all away and pull out.

After the president left, Jared and Ivanka seemed worried. They said they wanted to help McMaster. When we all get back, they said, why don’t you sit down with Porter and figure out a strategy, some way to withdraw some troops but also leave some? Find some way to talk to the president.



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On July 25, the president again berated McMaster. He had no interest in allies, Trump said. He didn’t want any troops in South Korea even when reminded about the differential between the seven seconds to detect an ICBM launch from there as opposed to 15-minute detection from Alaska.

On the colonnade outside the Oval Office, McMaster spoke with Cohn and Porter.

McMaster said that at 6:03 a.m., Trump had tweeted: “Ukrainian efforts to sabotage Trump campaign—‘quietly working to boost Clinton.’ So where is the investigation A.G. [attorney general]”

It was clearly Russian propaganda, McMaster said. He and the NSC and intelligence experts had concluded that. But the president had picked it up and shot it out.

McMaster said he wasn’t sure how long he could stay.

In the Oval Office later that day, McMaster had a sensitive order he wanted the president to sign relating to Libya.

I’m not going to sign it, Trump said. The United States should be getting oil. The generals aren’t sufficiently focused on getting or making money. They don’t understand what our objectives should be and they have the United States engaged in all the wrong ways.