Fear: Trump in the White House(70)

“Well, sir,” Cohn said, “you had the conversation with him . . .”

“I’m going to deny it,” Trump replied. “I never had that conversation with him.”

“Okay, sir, just reminding you that it’s going to come up.”

Cohn had witnessed this for over a year—denial when needed or useful or more convenient. “He’s a professional liar,” Cohn told an associate.

At lunch Turnbull carefully stepped Trump through their time at the G20 the previous summer.

Remember we were in Hamburg?

Yes, Trump said.

You took me back in your secure facility?

“Oh, yeah, I remember that,” Trump replied. “My security guys were so pissed. They couldn’t believe I did it.”

Remember what conversation we had?

Trump nodded.

We were talking about specialty steel that Australia exclusively produces.

A version of yes from Trump.

“We’ve got a $40 billion trade surplus?”

Yes, Trump knew that for sure.

And you agreed to let me out of any steel tariff?

“Oh, yeah,” Trump answered, “I guess I remember that.”

Cohn laughed.

Australian steel was later exempted, as were other nations. As of June 2018, Australia retained its exemption.





CHAPTER


26




McMaster had drinks with Dina Powell, a senior deputy from his staff, and Porter on July 15.

“The team of two,” McMaster said—Tillerson and Mattis—were making his position difficult and less and less tenable.

McMaster said that he believed Mattis and Tillerson had concluded that the president and the White House were crazy. As a result, they sought to implement and even formulate policy on their own without interference or involvement from McMaster, let alone the president.

Just the previous week, McMaster said that Tillerson had been in Qatar and signed an important Memorandum of Understanding with the Qatari foreign minister on counterterrorism and disabling the financing of terrorism.

McMaster said he had been completely in the dark about this. The secretary of state had not consulted or even informed him in advance. He had learned from press reports! In a news conference in Qatar, Tillerson had said the agreement “represents weeks of intensive discussions” between the two governments so it had been in the works for a while.

Porter said Tillerson had not gone through the policy process at the White House and had not involved the president either. Clearly Tillerson was going off on his own.

“It is more loyal to the president,” McMaster said, “to try to persuade rather the circumvent.” He said he carried out direct orders when the president was clear, and felt duty bound to do so as an Army officer. Tillerson in particular did not.

“He’s such a prick,” McMaster said. “He thinks he’s smarter than anyone. So he thinks he can do his own thing.”



* * *



In his long quest to bring order to the chaos, Priebus arranged for each of the key cabinet members to regularly check in. Tillerson came to his office at 5:15 p.m. on Tuesday, July 18.

McMaster had not been invited but joined the meeting anyway. He took a seat at the conference table. The national security adviser’s silent presence was ominous and electric.

Tell me, Priebus asked Tillerson, how are things going? Are you on track to achieve your primary objectives? How is the relationship between the State Department and the White House? Between you and the president?

“You guys in the White House don’t have your act together,” Tillerson said, and the floodgates gushed open. “The president can’t make a decision. He doesn’t know how to make a decision. He won’t make a decision. He makes a decision and then changes his mind a couple of days later.”

McMaster broke his silence and raged at the secretary of state.

“You don’t work with the White House,” McMaster said. “You never consult me or anybody on the NSC staff. You blow us off constantly.” He cited examples when he tried to set up calls or meetings or breakfasts with Tillerson. “You are off doing your own thing” and communicate directly with the president, Mattis, Priebus or Porter. “But it’s never with the National Security Council,” and “that’s what we’re here to do.” Then he issued his most dramatic charge. “You’re affirmatively seeking to undermine the national security process.”

“That’s not true,” Tillerson replied. “I’m available anytime. I talk to you all the time. We just had a conference call yesterday. We do these morning calls three times a week. What are you talking about, H.R.? I’ve worked with you. I’ll work with anybody.”

Tillerson continued, “I’ve also got to be secretary of state. Sometimes I’m traveling. Sometimes I’m in a different time zone. I can’t always take your calls.”

McMaster said he consulted with the relevant assistant secretaries of state if the positions were filled.

“I don’t have assistant secretaries,” Tillerson said, coldly, “because I haven’t picked them, or the ones that I have, I don’t like and I don’t trust and I don’t work with. So you can check with whoever you want. That has no bearing on me.” The rest of the State Department didn’t matter; if you didn’t go through him, it didn’t count.