Fear: Trump in the White House(52)
The problem was not so much just the chemical weapons, Graham said, it was the bombing of civilians. That shouldn’t be permitted with any weapon.
“If you don’t say that,” Graham pressed, “then all the things you’ve gained are going to be lost, because he’s just saying fuck you, okay, I’ll kill them another way. That’s what Assad will be saying to you. This is a test. One and done is not the right answer here. You let that fucker know that if he takes off from that air base and he bombs a bunch of kids with barrel bombs, you’ll shoot him down.”
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Whenever a commander in chief starts shooting, even with only 59 Tomahawks, political and public opinion tend to actively rally around him. This was no exception. Trump was almost universally praised for a quick and decisive response.
The next morning, Senator John McCain appeared on Morning Joe. “The signal that was sent last night, as you said, was a very, very important one.”
Host Joe Scarborough said it was important not only to Russia and Assad, but to China and North Korea. “And our friends,” McCain added. “A lot of the Arab countries are willing to be partners with us as long as they think they can rely on us.”
Scarborough observed that Sunni Arabs had felt that under Obama the U.S. hadn’t “had their back. Does last night change that?”
“It begins to,” Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, who was among the panel discussing the strike, said. “They want to see more.”
McCain praised Trump’s national security team, and praised the president for listening to them: “That’s what’s most encouraging to me, is that he respects Mattis. He respects McMaster.”
Some of the highest praise came from surprising foreign policy experts. Anne-Marie Slaughter, who had been director of the powerful Policy Planning staff in the State Department during Hillary Clinton’s first two years as secretary of state in the Obama years, tweeted, “Donald Trump has done the right thing on Syria. Finally!! After years of useless handwringing in the face of hideous atrocities.”
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In the days and weeks afterward, Trump often told aides in the West Wing that he did not think the strike on the air base was sufficient. Shouldn’t the U.S. do more? He toyed with the idea of ordering a covert leadership strike on Assad.
He had been briefed or read some papers on what nerve gas did to the human body. “Do you realize what it’s like?” he asked at one point. He had a visual image which he described. The lungs fill up. Breathing stifles, and there is foaming at the mouth. Drooling, blindness, paralysis. Uncontrollable vomiting, urination and defecation. Excruciating pain all over, especially abdominal cramps. Seizures. The organs of the body become disconnected from the brain. After this, 10 minutes of torture, death. Children. Babies.
He wanted options. They were plentiful. The United States military had all the imaginable lethal capabilities. What could he do? He wanted to know.
Secretary Mattis was alarmed that Trump might order a second strike and worked to tamp down and discourage another military action in Syria.
After weeks Trump’s outrage subsided and he turned, but not quickly, to other matters.
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McMaster complained to Jared about his lack of authority to move decisions forward. Like most secretaries of state and defense, Tillerson and Mattis did not want a strong national security adviser.
On one occasion after the Syrian strike, the president wanted some information about recent Russian and Iranian provocations in Syria. The U.S. had killed some Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah troops on the road east of Palmyra and shot down a threatening Iranian armed drone. Trump had some questions for McMaster. What happens if Americans get killed? What are we going to do? What are the options?
McMaster phoned both Tillerson and Mattis. No response. He summoned Harvey and lit into him. The F-words flew. This is your job, get your counterparts over there.
Nine hours passed, and still no response from either Tillerson or Mattis.
The Joint Staff from the Pentagon arrived at the White House to brief Harvey. The Defense Department had some strike options but nothing about what would happen if Americans got killed in the Syrian border town of Tanf where U.S. forces were operating. Or if a U.S. ship was hit by a mine.
It was incredible to both McMaster and Harvey. No answers were forthcoming. But Trump soon forgot his questions.
CHAPTER
19
I want an executive order withdrawing the United States from NAFTA”—the North American Free Trade Agreement—“and I want it on my desk by Friday,” President Trump ordered.
Gathered with him in the Oval Office on Tuesday, April 25, were Vice President Pence, Commerce Secretary Ross, Kushner, Porter and Navarro. The president wanted to be able to announce it on his 100th day in office.
When no one pushed back or offered any objections, Porter, who had been chairing the Tuesday-morning trade meetings, noted that it could not be an executive order but would have to be a 180-termination notice as required by the trade agreement.
“There’s a huge timing problem with this,” he told Trump and the others, “because no matter how quickly you end up renegotiating NAFTA under the Trade Promotion Authority rules, it’s going to take time.” A renegotiated agreement would have to be passed by Congress and that would take more than the 180 days.