Fear: Trump in the White House(41)

Another State Department representative noted that the central government lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan public, the lowest in 10 years, according to polling done in the country. He observed that the illicit economy, opium and illegal mining, was the size of the regular economy, and a significant portion was under control of Taliban insurgents.

After 9/11, the CIA and military had paid off the Afghan warlords to go after the Taliban. Some of that money had been used to target political opposition. Now the U.S. was spending about $50 billion a year in Afghanistan. Was the government, which was deeply corrupt, just taking money from the U.S. and the allies to fund themselves? Was the large level of assistance taking away the Afghan government’s incentive to develop real reforms and the political will to take on opium and profits from mining? American money was one of the poisons in the Afghan system.

A larger question loomed: Should the United States be playing to win in Afghanistan, or merely not to lose?

After one meeting they took whiteboards and broke into three groups to attempt to define the problem and state vital strategic objectives. Common to all three was the goal of preventing further attacks on the homeland.

They raised additional questions: What kind of government did Afghanistan need? And what kind of stability did the U.S. need to achieve the goal of preventing further terrorist attacks?



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Initially, in meetings with representatives from the Pentagon, State Department and the intelligence agencies, McMaster laid out his four frames or goals: 1. Achieve political stability that will include a political settlement with the insurgent Taliban. 2. Push for institutional actions by the Afghan government to counter the Taliban. 3. Increase pressure on neighboring Pakistan, which was playing a double game—nominally allied with the United States, but also supporting terrorists and the Taliban. 4. Maintain international support from the 39 countries allied with the United States in a coalition.

Casting about for a middle ground on more troops, McMaster considered a proposal for adding thousands more, perhaps 3,000 to 5,000, to prevent another terrorist attack. One staff proposal called for thinking about eventually adding tens of thousands.

At a Principals Committee meeting—so-called because unlike a NSC meeting, the principals meet without the president—Attorney General Sessions erupted at everyone, including McMaster, over the idea of more troops.

You’re basically walking the president into exactly what he doesn’t believe in, to a place he doesn’t want to go, Sessions said. We’re losing too many lives in Afghanistan. I don’t understand what you guys don’t get. This is not where the president’s at.

Priebus said, You have not spent the time working with the president on what his basic philosophy and foreign policy positions are, and why. With the president, he said, “why” is the most important part. Why are we here? Why are we doing this? What do you want to happen? And what exactly are we trying to accomplish?

This was precisely the question that Peter Lavoy had been asking in the Obama administration. Neither Priebus nor Lavoy received a satisfactory answer.

The principals’ consensus settled on adding up to 4,000 troops.

“Has anyone told the president,” Priebus asked, “that the option you’re choosing basically says we’re going to be in Afghanistan for decades? If you explain it to him, he’s going to go crazy. Who’s talking to him about these details?”

Silence.

Afterward, Priebus called a meeting of the key players.

“Look,” he said, “we’ve got a problem. We are not connecting with the president over the more basic issues. Why do you want to be there? What is the purpose? What is the fundamental value to the United States for risking American lives? You have to come to a fundamental understanding and agreement on those basic issues before you start talking about how many troops are we going to have in Afghanistan. You guys are like 10 steps ahead of yourselves.”

It was not enough for McMaster to declare the objective was to prevent another terrorist attack. The question was simple: How would several thousand more troops help to achieve that?

There were four missions in Afghanistan: train and advise the Afghan Army and police; logistical support; counterterrorism; and the intelligence mission. McMaster had to craft a strategy that avoided escalation, or the appearance of escalation. It could not directly or brazenly challenge Trump’s stated desire to get out, but had to softly market a new approach that soon would be called “stay the course.”

On March 28, McMaster proposed what became known to the NSC staff as the R4s: reinforce, realign, reconcile and regionalize. These were the components of the Afghanistan strategy he was proposing, and they fit neatly within his concept of four frames. Reinforcing meant more equipment and training; realigning meant targeting funding for areas under control of the Afghan government, rather than contested areas held by the Taliban; reconciling meant trying to get the Afghan government to be inclusive, hold elections and work with power brokers; and regionalizing meant the U.S. working with regional actors such as India.

By May, the proposed plan had settled on the middle ground of adding 3,000 to 5,000 more troops. Some would come in “off the books,” meaning they would not be counted in official public numbers.

The plan would be counterterrorism-centric. An aviation battalion would be available to help the Afghan Army when they were in a serious fight with the Taliban. The rules of engagement were being altered—previously, U.S. forces could only use force if they were threatened; now they could be used when the Afghan Army was threatened.