The Undoing Project: A Friendship that Changed the World(106)
——— . “The Neurobiological Origins of Psychoanalytic Dream Theory.” American Journal of Psychiatry 134, no. 11 (1978): 1211–21.
Kahneman, Daniel. “The Psychology of Possible Worlds.” Katz-Newcomb Lecture, April 1979.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. “The Simulation Heuristic.” In Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, 3–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
LeCompte, Tom. “The Disorient Express.” Air & Space, September 2008, 38–43. http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/the-disorient-express-474780/.
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–58.
CHAPTER 12: THIS CLOUD OF POSSIBILITY
Cohen, L. Jonathan. “On the Psychology of Prediction: Whose Is the Fallacy?” Cognition 7, no. 4 (1979): 385–407.
——— . “Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4, no. 3 (1981): 317–31. Followed by thirty-nine pages of letters, including Persi Diaconis and David Freedman, “The Persistence of Cognitive Illusions: A Rejoinder to L. J. Cohen,” 333–34, and a response by Cohen, 331–70.
——— . Knowledge and Language: Selected Essays of L. Jonathan Cohen, edited by James Logue. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2002.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. “How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond ‘Heuristics and Biases.’” In European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, edited by Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone, 83–115. Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1991.
——— . “On Cognitive Illusions and Rationality.” In Probability and Rationality: Studies on L. Jonathan Cohen’s Philosophy of Science, edited by Ellery Eells and Tomasz Maruszewski, 225–49. Poznan′ Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 21. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991.
——— . “The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic Mental Models.” In Rationality: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Ken Manktelow and David Over, 284–313. London: Routledge, 1993.
——— . “Why the Distinction between Single-Event Probabilities and Frequencies Is Important for Psychology (and Vice Versa).” In Subjective Probability, ed. George Wright and Peter Ayton, 129–61. Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1994.
——— . “On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky.” Psychological Review 103 (1996): 592–96.
——— . “Ecological Intelligence: An Adaptation for Frequencies.” In The Evolution of Mind, edited by Denise Dellarosa Cummins and Colin Allen, 9–29. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. “Discussion: On the Interpretation of Intuitive Probability: A Reply to Jonathan Cohen.” Cognition 7, no. 4 (1979): 409–11.
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.” Psychological Review 90, no. 4 (1983): 293–315.
——— . “Advances in Prospect Theory.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1992): 297–323. http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/psych466/articles/tversky_kahneman_jru_92.pdf.
Vranas, Peter B. M. “Gigerenzer’s Normative Critique of Kahneman and Tversky.” Cognition 76 (2000): 179–93.
CODA: BORA-BORA
Redelmeier, Donald A., and Robert J. Tibshirani. “Association between Cellular-Telephone Calls and Motor Vehicle Collisions.” New England Journal of Medicine 336 (1997): 453–58. http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM199702133360701#t=article.
Thaler, Richard. “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization l (1980): 39–60. http://www.eief.it/butler/files/2009/11/thaler80.pdf.
GENERAL
Kazdin, Alan E., ed. Encyclopedia of Psychology. 8 vols. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Murchison, Carl, Gardner Lindzey, et al., eds. A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Vols. I–IX. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, and Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1930–2007.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I never know exactly who to thank, or whether to say “whom” to thank. The problem is not a deficit of gratitude but a surplus of debt. I owe so many people that I don’t know where to start. But there are people without whom this book simply would not have come to pass, and I’ll focus on them.
Danny Kahneman and Barbara Tversky, for starters. When I met Danny, in late 2007, I had no ambition to write a book about him. Once I acquired that ambition, I spent roughly five years making him comfortable with it. Even then he remained, um, circumspect. “I don’t think it is possible to describe the two of us without simplifying, without making us too large, and without exaggerating the differences between our characters,” he once said. “That’s the nature of the task, and I am curious to see how you will deal with it—though not curious enough to want to read it early.” Barbara was a different story. Back in the late 1990s, by bizarre coincidence, I taught, or attempted to teach, her son Oren. As I was unaware of the existence of Amos Tversky, I was unaware that he was Amos Tversky’s son. Anyway, I went to Barbara bearing a character reference from my former pupil. Barbara gave me access to Amos’s papers, and her guidance. Amos’s children, Oren, Tal, and Dona, offered a view of Amos that I couldn’t have gotten anywhere else. I remain deeply grateful to the Tversky family.